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CLASS GIFTS

CLASS GIFTS -

THE VIRGINIA

RULE OF EARLY VESTING
SEBASTIAN GAETA

The devise or bequest to grandchildren has always represented dangerous ground to be surveyed carefully before
treading. Many grandparents have dutifully planned their
estates with the interests of grandchildren in mind, only to
have it illustrated that they have, perhaps, planned too extensively and the purpose has not only been thwarted but also
that the objects of their giving have lost the intended blessing.
Gifts to grandchildren are particularly susceptible to the
operation of the Rule Against Perpetuities. A gift "to my
grandchildren when they become twenty-five" is void if
there are no grandchildren who fit that description at the
testator's death. If the testator has children at his death they
are the only lives in being which can be used as a class to
measure the period since the grandchildren in being at the
testator's death may die and the children can have further
issue which would not be lives in being. Therefore under a
situation similar to the one stated, the period of years would
be measured from the death of the last surviving child. 1
This is not a field of possibilities. Professor Gray's statement of the Rule provides:
No interest is good unless it must vest...

This common situation of a testamentary gift to grandchildren arose in a recent Virginia case. 3 The testator provided in Clause Six of his holographic will that certain assets
"be placed in a fund from which my grandchildren are to
receive an education as high as their abilities may acquire."
He further provided in Clause Seven, after describing other
assets, "... and the proceeds from the other stocks are to go
12 SIMES, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, § 496 (1936).
2

GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, § 268 (3rd ed. 1915).

3

Burrus v. Baldwin, 199 Va. 883, 103 S.E.2d 249 (1958).
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in the fund created for my grandchildren. Each of whom are
to share alike." 4
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
provisions of the above clause were violative of the Rule:
When construed together these two items of the will
described first, the type of education each grandchild is
to receive, and second, the manner of ultimate distribution
of the fund. Thus the class of beneficiaries, the testator's
grandchildren, would open up to admit others who might
not qualify for educational benefits and would close at
the time of the ultimate distribution. 5
Very simply, the Court reasons that the provision under
Clause Six is violative of the Rule since the educational needs
may arise or terminate more than twenty-one years and ten
months after the last life in being dies. Therefore the Court
also holds Clause Seven void since the fund would be distributed only upon the termination of all the educational
needs and thus, according to the Court's reasoning, may vest
in parties which may not be lives in being or be takers within
the period of the Rule.
It is readily seen that the Court's decision contemplates
postponed vesting, that is, the grandchildren have no transmissible interest or right until time for distribution.
It appears both appropriate and necessary to distinguish the
problem of closing the class to determine maximum membership, and vesting, which determines the minimum membership. These two are not dependent upon each other. 6 For
example, it is possible for a single member of a class to have the
gift vest as to him, thereby creating the minimum membership
while the class remains open, allowing in new members until
the class doses. To further illustrate: A gift (not per capita)
to my grandchildren who reach twenty-one years of age. At
4 Id. at 887.

51d. at 888.
6 SIMES, HORNBOOK ON FUTURE INTERESTS, § 91 (1951).
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the death of the testator no such grandchildren are twenty-one
years old. Now the class can increase and there has been no
vesting and there has been no closing. But upon one grandchild reaching the age of twenty-one, the class is closed as to
maximum membership (afterborns are closed out) and the
qualifying grandchild is entitled to his share. If there be five
grandchildren alive he has the right of possession in one-fifth.
However the class is not vested as to minimum membership
since the contingency of survivorship still remains. This result
involves the Rule of Convenience. 7
Thus in a situation where the gift is "to my grandchildren
who reach twenty-five" and a grandchild is twenty-five at the
testator's death, the gift will be valid under the Rule of Convenience since, although it is possible for other grandchildren,
not in esse, to reach twenty-five more than twenty-one years and
ten months after the last life in being, these persons are precluded from becoming members of the class which must be
confined to those in being at the death of the testator.8
In the instant case the Court, recognizing the Virginia rule
of early vestingg counters the argument thusly:
But of course the early vesting rule does not prevail over
the expression of contrary intent by the testator.
While this rule gives way to contrary intent such intent
must be clear:
When words imply futurity of time, courts are accustomed
to construe the expressions as meaning the time possession
shall accrue rather than conditions upon which the right
shall vest. 10
The decision turns on the Court's insistence that the provision for education attaches a futurity which prevents immediate vesting. However in Clause Seven there is provided that
each of the grandchildren 'are to share alike." This clause does
7Ibid.
8 2 SIMES, supra note 1, § 528, p. 402.
0

Rennolds v. Branch, 182 Va. 678, 689, 33 S.E.2d 200 (1944).
'l Id. at 691.
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not seem to call for postponement of the right. It is well settled that there is no presumption against early vesting and
postponed distribution.The Court's refusal of early vesting is supported by Harris
v. Harris,12 which dealt with a conveyance as follows:
...after their death (the life tenants) to be equally divided
in fee simple, among the children ...

when the youngest

shall have attained the age of (21) years.
It would appear that this case presents quite a different
problem than the instant case. Here the futurity may be said to
be annexed to the giving. In jurisdictions having the so-called
Divide and Payover Rule, a gift which employs a direction to
divide or pay at a future time creates a future gift and contingency rather than immediate and vested.13
The Harrisgift by its very terms is placed in the future. Also
in Driskellv. Carwile,'4 which the Court cites as supporting the
Harris result of postponed vesting, the words employed are,
"to be sold and equally divided... " Nowhere in the Burrus
case does such a direction appear. These cases may be explained and justified as proper results of application of this
Divide and Payover Rule.' 1
Another distinguishing feature of these two cases is that the
gifts are not direct but are gifts over after a precedent life
estate. The gift here is direct and entirely to the grandchildren.
The problem may well be the one which Professor Alford
suggests:
The construction by the Court may rest upon a confusion of
postponement of enjoyment with postponement of vesting. 16
11 SIMES, supra note 6 at p. 268.
12Harris v. Harris, 166 Va. 351, 358, 186 S.E. 29, 32 (1936).

13 SIMES and SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, § 657 (2nd ed.
1956).
14145 Va. 116, 133 S.E. 773 (1926).
15 While the Driskell case presents a statement of the Divide and Pay Over
Rule, there is conflict as to whether the Rule is law in Virginia. (LAMB,
VIRGINIA PROBATE PRACTICE, § 133 (1957).
16 Annual Surey of Va. Law, VA. L. REV. 1409, (1958).
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The Court's rejection of early vesting is supported by this
reasoning:
In the present case there are no words indicative of a gift to
the grandchildren with the immediate right of possession.
(emphasis added) 17
But as the Court in its discussion notes:
. . . a contingent gift.., must vest... 18
Of course, the Rule contemplates the concept of vesting in
interest. The term "vest" as used 'in the Rule refers to a
vesting in interest and not in possession. 19
In view of the Virginia rule of early vesting, what in the will
indicates that vesting be postponed? If Clause Six, the educational provision, is cited as requiring such a result this would
also require that little or no notice be given to the provision of
Clause Seven, "to share alike."
Even if Virginia did not have the rule of early vesting, which
creates a presumption necessitating a dear intention otherwise2l to overcome it, the general rule of construction would
seem sufficient to prevent an invalid interpretation of the will:
Where one construction of the will will be void because of
perpetuity and another construction of the will is valid, the
court sustains the construction which maintains the validity
of the will. 22
The presence of the provision "to share alike" not only
allows immediate vesting but demands it. What adverse rule
of construction, applicable, could operate to postpone vesting
when the general rule calls for immediate vesting?
17 199 Va. 889, 103 S.E.2d 254 (1958).
18 Id.
1 McComb v. McComb, 96 Va. 779, 32 S.F. 453 (1899); American National
Bank and Trust Co. of Danville v. Herndon, 181 Va. 17, 23 S. 768
(1943).
21 Boyd v. Fanelli, 199 Va. 357, 99 SXE.2d 619 (1958).
22

Jewett v. Harvie 183 Va. 734, 33 SYF. 2d 213 (1945) as cited in 20
MICHI'S JURISPRUDENCE, WILLS § 75; 5 PAGE ON WILS § 30.13
(3rd ed. 1961).
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cites authority as follows:

Time of Distributionas Determining Membership
Although as has been seen, the general rule favors the
death of the testator as the time forfixing the membership in a
class, there are numerous decisions to the effect that where
distribution is to be made among a class upon some contingency or at some time subsequent to the testator's decease, then those, and those only, who belong to the class
when such time or contingency arrives are entitled to share
in the distribution. (emphasis added) 24
The Harriscase cites this with approval:
We think this was a gift to a class the members of which were
to be fixed after the termination of the life estate of the grantors.
(emphasis added) 25
As has been discussed, there is a dangerous distinction,
often ignored, between vesting and closing the class. Vesting
affords the class the right to the gift, closing determines the
membership. The cases and the authority cited are correct-as
to the time when the class closes and the membership determined. 2 6

The above treatise, cited by both cases is inconsistent. Its
title is concerned with determination of membership but in the
text the rules of closing the class are applied to the concept of
vesting. This is erroneous. To do so would result in applying
a rule analagous to that of immediate gifts, where both minimum and maximum memberships are determined simultaneously, to gifts which are not immediate and by their terms require the class to stay open while not requiring postponed
vesting.
Under situations of distribution subsequent to the death of
the testator it is not uncommon for courts to fail to make this
distinction:
23
24
25
26

145 Va. 116, 121, 133 S.E. 773, 774 (1926).
28 R. C. L. p. 264, § 238.
166 Va. 351, 354, 33 S.E.2d 29, 31 (1936).
SIMES and SMITH, supra note 13, §§ 631-637, 640, 642-647. See especially
§ 643.
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Many of the decisions involve only a question of the closing
of the class. Since the question of the vesting of the class is
not actually involved, the courts fail to differentiate the two
problems, and lay down a rule broad enough to include
both. 2 7
The authors continue to discuss and illustrate this result
which they term "error."
The problem of dosing the class is, of course, infinitely
more complex than the cursory discussion here which has been
for the purpose of distinguishing vesting and closing the
class. 2
Up to this point the discussion has been confined to substantiating the argument of early vesting under the facts presented by the Burrus case. If early vesting was allowed there
would be many possible results.
As has been noted, if Clause Seven was the only gift there
would be no problem. Reading it, "to my grandchildren who
shall share alike," would constitute an immediate gift. The
class would vest and dose at the testator's death and those
grandchildren in esse would represent the class and dose out
the afterboms.2 9
But the problem here does not contemplate immediacy but
by its very terms calls for postponed distribution. Disregarding
the Rule Against Perpetuities for a moment, the devise and
bequest is for education of the grandchildren and then the excess to be shared alike among the beneficiaries. The lay testator
generally is unaware of the Rule and probably intends to indude all his grandchildren, regardless of when distribution
takes place. 3o The same can be said about his ignorance of the
various rules of construction.
27 Id.

§

654.

28Id. § 632. The discussion here dearly illustrates the distinction and offers

excellent examples of possibilities which might arise as a result of applying some of the theories pronounced by various courts.
291d. § 636.
30 This the authorities have agreed upon in setting out the general principles
from which the problem is approached. See note 6.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

3:435

A potential difficulty which we cannot ignore is that we do
not know when distribution is to take place. We can only say
that the time is indefinite. There is authority which holds:
The general rule upon this subject is, that where there is an
indefinite period for distribution, the legacy vests at the
death of the testator, and that none can take except those in
esse at that time. 3,
If the above be applied there would be no difficulty with the
Rule. Only the grandchildren in being would be entitled under
Clause Six or Clause Seven. This result is certainly simple and
would give remedy to the problem but at the same time work an
unjustified hardship on afterborn class members. A case
where an intervening life estate, an indefinite period, represents the postponement is enough to illustrate the inherent
unfairness and fallacy in such a sweeping rule. 3
The better rule would be that a gift to a class to vest in
possession on a future event should be construed to include
members of the class born after the death of the testator and
prior to the event. There is no inconvenience in doing so since
distribution is postponed until the occurrence of the event.
However if Clause Six be declared void as a perpetuity the
grandchildren would take the entire fund under Clause Seven
since the distribution is for the excess, 3 3 and under the
reasoning that the gifts are separable, Clause Seven is not void
merely because Clause Six may be. The difficulty is that distribution would be immediately possible since there is no postponing feature and following the Rule of Convenience the gift
is immediately vested in the grandchildren in esse and the class
dosed as to afterborns. We therefore arrive at the same result, as to the beneficiaries, found in the Meyer case but our
arrival is by different means.
3

1 Meyer v. Meyer, 2 MCCORD'S CH. 214, 16 A. D. 648 (1827).

32

However there is authority which distinguishes the situation of a life estate
representing the postponing event as being not considered an indefinite
period contemplated in the rule set forth in the Meyer case. (96 C. J. S.
§ 695 (4) p. 44).

33 SIMES, supra note 6, at p. 267.
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There should be no problem as to Clause Six if the interests
are declared vested immediately upon each grandchild coming
into being. In Bayly v. Curlette34 a gift to grandchildren was
postponed until the youngest reached twenty-one. The gift was
held vested immediately, subject to open. The Court distinguishes this case on the ground that the gift included a provision for maintenance as well as education, affording the heirs
an immediate right of enjoyment in the fund.
The distinction is unjustified. Vesting merely gives the heir
the right to the gift. Under a gift "to the children of X, but if
any child does not live to be twenty-five his share to terminate,"
this gift is vested subject to defeasance. 3 5
Again we must distinguish right and enjoyment. Certainly
the children of X have no right of immediate enjoyment, but
they have the right to demand when possession is to commence.
In Burrus if a grandchild lacks the ability or dies before
school age his share is divested. What occurs after the point of
vesting does not interfere with the gift as a valid interest. While
it may be true that gifts over may be bad, in the example of X's
children a gift over to their children, such is not the case here.
While the divesting event may take place beyond the period of
the Rule its effect would not create a perpetuity since it is represented in the already vested gift of Clause Seven.
Therefore all gifts to the grandchildren whenever born
should be considered vested immediately subject to open.
Distribution under Clause Seven takes effect upon the termination of the education by the class and the takers should properly be the entire class and the heirs of any deceased members
per stirpes.
The result of the Court's decision, which shall be noted but
not discussed, may be important as a practical matter. By dedaring the provisions of Clauses Six and Seven void the gifts
did not pass to strangers but went to the testator's children
thereby endowing the parents of the intended beneficiaries.
34

117 Va. 253, 84 S.E. 642, (1915).

35 SIMES, supra note 6, at p. 267.

